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"NO TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION": A
BRITISH PERSPECTIVE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
THE RT HON LORD JUDGEt
Luck plays its part in all our lives. My mother gave birth to me in
the tiny island of Malta in the middle of a bombing raid in which the
hospital took a direct hit. At that time, Malta was the most bombed place
on earth. Not so long ago my mother pointed out to me that she gave
birth to me without there being any water or electricity, and that a bomb
trajectory fifteen yards nearer to where she lay would have meant "no
you, no me, and no daddy," because my father was in the Royal Air
Force, serving King and country, in World War II, and had broken curfew to be with her. Luck plays its part in all our lives, sometimes for
good, sometimes for bad.
My mother is Maltese, and the present Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales is only half English. I am proud of both my heritages,
and proclaim them. I still have memories of childhood, when my mother,
who was-and remains-a firm admirer of England, would nevertheless
turn to us children, and point out that we were half Maltese, and that this
was "the better half too." Or, when my father had annoyed her, when she
would tell us that "we," meaning the Maltese, "were civilised when
daddy was covered in woad"-that is war paint. My father was a lovely
man, and even as a child I knew that she was exaggerating. My father
had never worn woad in his life. But I venture to discuss these aspects of
my background, not merely to give you a true impression of a wonderful
and loving childhood, but to suggest that I have been offered the opportunity of the wider perspective that ought to follow from mixed nationality.
And that brings me to the more important points. Where I touch on
the affairs of the U.S., I offer my thoughts with due humility, apologising
in advance with the inevitable-but I assure you, unintended-errors or
insensitivities. And, having listened to the entire conference so far, forperhaps-picking up the wrong end of a particular discussion. No offence is intended. What follows are my personal thoughts, as an outside
observer-an admiring outside observer certainly-but no expert. I am
profoundly aware that the true experts on your constitutional arrangements are here, among you.
t Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales. This Article is based on the Lord Judge's remarks delivered to the Tenth Circuit Bench & Bar Conference in August of 2010. Publication of this
Article would not have been possible without the efforts and support of Judge Neil M. Gorsuch.
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I was called to the Bar of England and Wales at the Middle Temple
in London. So was the man credited with coining one of the most historic
and symbolic phrases ever coined: "no taxation without representation,"
John Dickinson. He also wrote the Liberty Song in 1768:
"Then join hand in hand, brave Americans all,
By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall."
Five American lawyers from the Middle Temple signed the Declaration of Independence.' The Americans were publicly supported, among
many others, by Edmund Burke, a Middle Templar, and all were greatly
influenced by William Blackstone, another. We know that the father of
the great Chief Justice Marshall, to whom I shall come, subscribed to his
own edition of Blackstone, and the Chief Justice referred to it in his
seminal decision in Marbury v. Madison. Just to be clear that men of
action as well as men of thought were involved, it was a Middle Templar, John Laurens, who fought at the battle of Yorktown and negotiated,
as George Washington's representative, the surrender of the British
forces. And when Washington was appointing his first justices to the
Supreme Court, two were Middle Templars. Two of that hugely impressive line of justices from their day to this happened to have been with us.
And it is indeed a privilege that Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor
have been here.
Mrs. John Adams, the wife of the second President, would have approved. Her letters show how determined she was that the founding fathers should have recognised that half the human race was female. And
what a tribute to John Adams himself that such a remarkable and wonderful woman should have loved him as she did. There must have been
something very special about him, and indeed in my view there was.
Dickinson's first journey to England in 1753, in what was not much
more than a wooden tub, took 59 days, 2 months. And he wrote home to
his mother that he had been sea sick on 35 of them. My wife, Judith, and
I arrived here after 9 hours in an aeroplane. But Dickinson, and hundreds
like him, braved the elements. A lot of them rather enjoyed their visit to
London, although according to Charles Carroll, perhaps a rather toffeenosed young man from Maryland, there were "few young gentlemen ...
to be found of sound morals." Well no doubt, for young men then-as
for young men always-wine, women, and song did not lack their attractions. The President of the first Continental Congress, who preceded the
first President of the United States as the titular head of the infant Republic, was a Middle Templar. This was Peyton Randolph. So were two of
the following Presidents of the Congress. Thomas McKean and Cyrus
I. I am indebted to Judge Eric Stockdale from England and Justice Randy Holland from
Delaware whose illuminating work, the Middle Temple Lawyers and the American Revolution, sets
out this fascinating story.
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Griffin. So were four drafters of the Articles of Confederation, so were
seven of those who signed the Constitution.
I am not drawing your attention to these facts for the purposes of
decoration. They matter to me personally because I believe that the rule
of law which we all espouse comes from deep within the roots of our
national histories. That is why they merit examination. The deeper the
roots go, the more entrenched they become in the unconscious as well as
the conscious soul of the nation. In our communities, the citizen does not
merely hope for justice based on the rule of law, but expects and demands it. We live in happier lands just because these roots go so deep,
and my thesis is that your roots did not begin in 1776, and you should not
assume that they did.
One of the problems with history is that when we look back at what
happened, we assume that what happened would inevitably have happened. I mean no disrespect, but even if the American War of Independence was destined to succeed, those who took part in it had no particular
reason to believe that it would. It took great courage to sign up to it. As a
Middle Templar, I am proud of my forebears who had the courage to
take their stand of principle at an uncertain time when, if they had been
unsuccessful, they would undoubtedly have been hanged. That was a
point, I believe, explained by John Adams at one of the early Congress
meetings when the chubby, future President pointed out to one of his
skinnier colleagues that it would take him longer to die because he did
not weigh so much. Benjamin Franklin made the same point. If they did
not hang together, they would be hanged separately. That is something
we can laugh at now, but for them it was not a joke. The risks were huge.
Of course, for the reasons given by Thomas Paine in Common
Sense-that great seminal work-independence was bound to happen:
but not necessarily then, not necessarily as an outcome of their particular
struggle. Moreover, this particular war divided both nations. It was in
truth a civil war. That is why William Pitt, who only a few years earlier
had been the Prime Minister in London when the Colonists-that was
what they were called then-fought side by side with British soldiers in
the Seven Years War with France, was able, during the course of the
conflict, in a speech in the House of Lords, to assert that America could
not be conquered, and that he would seek to invoke what he described as
the "genius of the constitution." Edmund Burke, who was responsible for
one of my favourite sayings, that the rule of law demanded the hearing of
disputes before the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," confessed in
On Conciliation with America, that he did not know "the method of
drawing up an indictment against a whole people." These were great
Englishmen, who understood and spoke out in favour of the justice of the
Colonist position.
Here, as we have seen, Peyton Randolph was the first President of
Congress, a Middle Templar, but his brother John took a different view
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of the struggle, and he went to live and eke out his days in sad exile in
England. Yet his son, Edmund, became an aide to George Washington,
and his first Attorney General. But if you want to understand that this
was indeed a civil war, look no further than Benjamin Franklin himself.
His achievements were manifold. But in view of the discussion here this
week, perhaps I should point out that he changed Jefferson's mellifluous
style in the first draft of the Declaration of Independence from "we hold
these truths to be sacred and undeniable," to the much briefer, but the
inescapable and ultimately incontrovertible words which echo to us
down the ages: "we hold these truths to be self-evident." One word, or
perhaps two, are always better than three, and the one he chose put the
issue beyond argument. Returning to my theme, his son took the opposite
side to his father. They never fought in battle, but except on one occasion
to resolve the payment of a debt, I believe that they never spoke again.
His son's son, that is his grandson, took the same view as Benjamin
Franklin himself. Thus are the tribulations of civil strife imposed as a
burden on contemporaries who have to live through it. For you, of
course, an even greater civil war was to come. And by then we had had
our own civil war.
These considerations enable me to suggest to you that some of the
documents of English history which matter greatly to me, continue to
matter greatly to you, and should be seen as part of the foundation of
your nation. They include the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right
of 1626, the Grand Remonstrance of 1641, and the Bill of Rights of
1689. Your constitutional roots include a civil war which culminated in
the execution in 1649 of a monarch who proclaimed the Divine Right of
Kings, and the removal of another in 1688 when he sought to subvert the
constitutional changes consequent on the execution of his father. All
these events influenced the thinking of the Colonists, and the constitutional arrangements which they were seeking to uphold. It was part of
their history, as it is of our history. And that is why I respectfully suggest
that it remains part of your history. But notice for the future: our civil
war was a war brought about in a struggle about the rule of law. Could it
possibly be that, in the Latin, rex est lex or rex est lex loquens? It was
lawyers-not exclusively lawyers, but many of the most influential
members of Parliament-who challenged the concept of the Divine
Right were lawyers. By the end of the Civil War, there was a public trial
of a monarch for waging war on his subjects. And we have the record.
The King argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to try him. In constitutional theory, it was an arguable point. In practical terms, however, it
was doomed to failure. And his execution demonstrated the reality of the
17 'hcentury observation, "be ye never so high, the law is above you."
May I go back: Sir Walter Raleigh, a man who saw a great future in
the potato as well as tobacco, was a Middle Templar. I am not here on
behalf of the Middle Temple to receive a writ in a class action. He re-
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ceived a charter which enabled him to explore the east coast of America,
which is now Virginia. Less important, his nickname was "Swisser Swatter." You may wonder how that came about. We are told that he was
engaging in very close social exchanges with a pretty young lady in
court, who began by saying "oh sweet Sir Walter," but who, as her rapture increased found herself confined to uttering "Swisser Swatter." And
to think, that we thought that the joys of sex had only been discovered in
the last century.
One of the ships which explored Virginia, and settled a small number on Roanoke Island, was captained by Phillip Amadas, another Middle Templar. His efforts were met by a fine by the Benchers on the basis
that he was absent for longer than he should have been without permission. They presumably failed to understand that in those days timetables
across the Atlantic were not very efficient.
Another link is Sir Francis Drake, who sailed the Golden Hind
around the world, and in his circumnavigation explored the west coast of
America, now California. Our records show that his "happy return" was
greeted with much joy and acclamation at the Middle Temple. Francis
Drake is famous in English history for his determination, when the news
of the great Spanish Armada was approaching the coast of England in
1588, to finish his game of bowls, before returning to what became the
great sea battle. If the Armada of 1588 had prevailed, the history of the
U.S. would have been very different. There would have been no license
to the Pilgrim Fathers. The common law, and its principles, would have
been extinguished before they ever left the shores of England. Francis
Drake did make one observation, which I offer you as still encapsulating
a principle of life: "There must be a beginning of any great matter, but
the continuing unto the end until it be thoroughly finished, yields the
true glory."
When you are called to the Bar at the Middle Temple you sign the
book, and I did, and so many of your forebears did, on a table made from
a gun hatch of the Golden Hind itself.
Interesting as these considerations all are, one of the great heroes
for us all, and that includes you, is Sir Edwin Sandys, who drafted the
first Royal Charter granted to the Virginia Company in April 1606. Sandys was no supporter of the Divine Right of Kings. He was one of those
who questioned and opposed it. He found himself in the Tower for his
beliefs. But in 1618 he succeeded in obtaining the "Great Charter" for
Virginia. This charter established the right of settlers, and any of their
children born in the new colonies and plantations, to "have and enjoy all
liberties, franchises, and immunities to all intents and purposes as if they
had been abiding and born within this our realm of England." This language was later to be repeated as other colonies were established, including Maryland (1632), Maine (1639), Connecticut (1662), Carolina (1663
and 1665), Rhode Island (1663), and Massachusetts Bay (1691). And
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these words, hardly surprisingly, led those with trained legal minds to
question the constitutionality, or the legality, of the efforts of Parliament
in London in the Eighteenth Century to curtail or diminish what they
believed were their now longstanding rights. And the Virginia Charter
similarly provided guarantees for the Colonists of "self government,
freedom of speech, equality before the law, and trial by jury." Thus, it is
that 1776 was not about abstract rights. It was about the preservation of
what were believed to be existing rights.
One of the major complaints against the Stamp Act of 1765 was the
deprivation of those charged with contravening its provisions of trial by
jury. Another Middle Templar, Robert Goldsborough of Maryland, spoke
of "acts and legislative aggression by the mother country." And here was
the context in which Dickenson's great phrase, "No taxation without
representation" was coined. And, echoing the dictum of Sir Edward
Coke-one of my great predecessors-who, in 1616, was deprived of his
office and hurled into the Tower because he responded to the King's
belief that judges should be lions under the throne, that the judges would
do what it was appropriate for the judges to do, and who had suggested
in Bonham 's Case that statute was not always supreme. James Otis of
Massachusetts urged that "an act against natural equity was void." And
John Adams himself told a judge who was doubtful about the possible
nullity of an Act of Parliament, "tell the jury the nullity of acts of Parliament ... I am determined to die of that opinion."
Am I the only person here who is moved by the thought that as long
ago as 1618, a tiny band of individuals believed that concepts like freedom of speech and trial by jury actually mattered? At a time when such
concepts would have been beyond the comprehension of any other contemporary society of which I am aware. And we all still believe it. Your
constitutional arrangements-and ours-seek above all to ensure equality before the law. And in particular the concept that no one is above the
law or may break it with impunity was established by our civil war: self
government-what is now called democracy-should always be at work
in our constitutional arrangements: freedom of speech as a matter of
right, what President Roosevelt identified as "the first freedom"; and trial
by jury, that no one should be liable to imprisonment for a serious crime
unless he or she has publicly admitted it, or sufficient evidence has been
produced to enable twelve of his fellow citizens to be convinced of his
guilt. As Lord Devlin once memorably put it, trial by jury is the "lamp by
which we know that freedom lives." These venerable and venerated concepts are an ineradical part of the fabric of both our societies, and our
constitutional arrangements are there to preserve and uphold the rule of
law. Not, of course, rule by lawyers or by judges, but the rule of law itself.
In the United States you have a written constitution. Contrary to
popular myth, we in Britain also have a constitution that is written. The
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main difference is this: your constitution is embodied in a single document to which-as needs must-amendments or additions have been
made over the years. Our constitution is not. It is largely, but not exclusively (but that would take a lecture of its own) to be found in statute, in
legislation enacted in Parliament. In our system, Parliament is sovereign.
It may-and in relation to all the great nations that were once part of the
British Empire, like Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India-it ceded
its theoretical sovereignty to another body: to a very limited extent it
ceded some of its sovereignty to the European Court of Justice in relation
to affairs arising in the European Economic Community. But ultimately
in the United Kingdom it is sovereign. Our recent constitutional changes
were produced by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005. It had many
facets, but notice the first and most significant is that it is an Act of Parliament. That process could not have happened in the U.S. Your constitution would have forbidden it.
The process for change began with an announcement by the Prime
Minister that the Lord Chancellor's office would be abolished. In other
words 1300 or 800 years (whichever it was, a very very long time) of
history would be wiped out. The initial proposal was met with severe
opposition in the House of Lords. The fact was that you could not abolish
the office. No less than 400 statutes provided for the existence of this
office. In the result the office of Lord Chancellor survived, but with radically altered powers. He is no longer the Speaker of the House of Lords,
nor President of the Courts of England and Wales, nor the Head of the
Judiciary, nor able to sit as a judge. Many of the responsibilities of the
Lord Chancellor were devolved to the Lord Chief Justice. Thus the Lord
Chief Justice is the Head of the Judiciary of England and Wales and
President of its courts. He is responsible for representing the views of the
judiciary to Parliament, to the Lord Chancellor, and to Ministers of the
Crown as, and when, necessary. He is required to maintain appropriate
arrangements for discipline, welfare, training, and guidance of judgeswithin the resources made available by the Lord Chancellor-as well as
maintaining arrangements for the deployment of judicial office holders
throughout the courts of England and Wales. He must negotiate with the
Lord Chancellor a budget for the efficient administration of justice. But,
above all, and I speak entirely personally, he must sit as a judge. For me
that remains his primary responsibility.
All that may lead you to understand why I spoke with the passion
that I did the other day about the need to manage time. I asked Judith's
permission to refer you to Andrew Marvell's poem To His Coy Mistress.
When I was a teenager I knew all the naughty bits, but now I cannot remember how long he intended to adore each of her breasts. I only remember that all around him he could hear "times wing6d chariot hurrying near."
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This leads me on to point about which there was much discussion at
the conference. Another major change of our new constitutional arrangements was the creation of an independent Judicial Appointments
Commission ("JAC"). Effectively, the Lord Chancellor and the executive
is deprived of involvement in judicial appointments. The Lord Chancellor is not a member, nor is he represented among the members of the
JAC. In constitutional theory, every judge at every level is appointed by
the Queen. So the Commission recommends the appointment to her. Perhaps I can tell you of the system for my appointment as Lord Chief Justice. The selection was made by a Commission consisting of two senior
judges, the senior Law Lord and the Master of the Rolls, together with
the Chairman of the JAC and her nominee, who could not be a judge.
They did not present a slate of candidates from which the Lord Chancellor or Prime Minister could choose one. They put forward one name. The
Prime Minister is entitled to decline to recommend that name to the
Queen, provided he gives public reasons for doing so. If he does so, that
would have been a veto on my appointment. But the nuclear option could
be fired once: if it had been fired, the Commission would then have met
again, and the Prime Minister would then have had no option but to put
that name forward to the Queen for appointment. Similar processes follow for all the senior Heads of Division and the members of the Supreme
Court. Although for appointment to the Supreme Court-which is the
final court for Scotland and Northern Ireland as well as England and
Wales-the head of the JAC for each of those countries forms part of the
selection panel.
I like to think that the selection of our judges and in particular the
senior judiciary is now as immune from the political process as it is possible to be in a democratic society.
Another change related to the removal of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary from the House of Lords, and the creation of the new Supreme
Court of the United Kingdom. The previous members of the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords became the first members of the Supreme Court, and the Senior Law Lord became its first President. This
provision consolidated, in constitutional theory, the separation of the
judiciary from the legislature at the highest level. I hasten to add that it
did not turn a group of twelve lambs into lions: for years there has been
government complaints about the way in which-putting it shortly-the
Law Lords had failed to implement government policy, and frustrated
exclamation by politicians about judges frustrating the will of Parliament. The old Law Lords were lions alright. And they did not change
when they moved premises. Nevertheless the new Supreme Court has not
been vested with any additional power to the jurisdiction and authority
enjoyed by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords: and there
has been no diminution in its powers either.
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The result is that the final court in Britain, the Supreme Court, does
not enjoy the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court of the U.S. It
cannot strike down, and has never yet sought to strike down, legislation
properly enacted. There is a developing theory that any legislation which
can properly be said to be "unconstitutional" may be open to question,
but this is being tentatively explored in judgments. It has nothing to do
with the Constitution Reform Act itself.
Be all that as it may, as things stand, the role of your Supreme Court
in what in truth are social questions is, to British eyes, quite remarkable.
Let me take one example: the question of termination of pregnancy, issues of life and death, and the dignity and autonomy of women. The attitude of the law to these questions tells us much of what sort of a country
we are. For us, the issue of abortion was resolved by an Act of Parliament, the Abortion Act of 1967. For you, the issue has been resolved by
the Supreme Court. Am I wrong to understand that a five to four vote of
unelected judges represents the law which governs "we, the people"?
This is not a criticism. I am merely identifying an important difference.
And I shall offer my own theory for the difference in a moment.
This question of judicial voting in your Supreme Court led to an
element of the discussion at the conference which troubled me. I hate the
word "ideology" to be applied to any judge. Surely every judge applies
the law as he or she conscientiously analyses it.
Any politicisation of the process is fraught with danger. Judges are
not politicians. They are independent of the political process. And the
appointment of judges should not give anyone the opportunity for political posturing, let alone political preference. I recognise that within your
constitution the functions of the Supreme Court are fundamental,
whereas if our Supreme Court reaches a decision of which Parliament
does not approve, Parliament can enact whatever amending provision it
likes. Nevertheless if the process of appointment to your Supreme Court
were the process in England and Wales I should be immensely troubled,
and for this reason. The more we allow the appointment of judges to become part of the political process, the quicker the judiciary will become
subsumed in it. And what price then, judicial independence?
But how has all this come about? In my view-but I do not claim
any scholarship- the differences are a consequence of the circumstances
which obtained in the 1770s, and the very early days when the new republic was working out its own destiny. My thesis is that in England we
granted ultimate sovereignty to Parliament because it was through Parliament that we sought to curb the divine right of kings, first in consequence of the ancient arrangements which prohibited the imposition of
taxation without parliamentary consent-"no taxation without representation" indeed-and then, as the claim for privileges and protection grew
when Parliament refused to endorse the King's request for additional
taxation without some concession from him, and ultimately by going to
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war. In other words, in our arrangements the potential for tyranny was
gradually removed by insisting on the parliamentary legislative process,
and victory in battle. In your situation, many years later-as we have
seen from Goldsborough, and Otis, and Adams, and perhaps most important of all, from Jefferson's first draft of the Declaration, which directly
attacked Parliament- Parliament was undoubtedly perceived to be integral to the problem. Central to your grievances was the Stamp Act, an
Act of Parliament, not simply the diktat of a monarch, like the demand
for ship money was. Your ancestors were claiming the same right not to
be taxed unless they were represented which had been established, as
they believed, in their constitutional affairs for years: now it was being
taken away. And if that was being taken away, so could all the other immunities and privileges and principle, such as trial by jury, and so on. In
the 1760s and 1770s, Parliament in London appeared to be unwilling or
unable to see that the position of the Americans was entirely consistent
with established constitutional principles. For you a sovereign Parliament
was the problem. It could therefore not be the solution.
Consciously or unconsciously, the founders of the Constitution decided on a method of limiting or controlling not only the executive, but
the legislature. For these purposes, the principle of separation of powers
provided the answer-at any rate in the sense of expressed constitutional
theory by John Locke at the end of the 17th century-formulated when
we in England were enmeshed in the development of a constitution based
on our own Bill of Rights. The celebrated French philosopher Montesquieu, who examined the English constitutional system in the 18 th century in the context of contemporary France: where the king was untrammelled by the equivalent of Parliament, and enjoyed dictatorial powers,
perhaps best encapsulated in the-to our eyes-repugnant letters de cachet. He, like Voltaire, believed that the solution to the dangers of an
absolute monarch had been achieved in England and attributed them to a
concept of a separation of powers which did not, and never had-and
indeed never has-existed in England. All this shows that you should
never doubt the value to lawyers of a legal or political theory which perfectly appears to address what their instincts tell them is needed. But so it
was, that the separation of powers assumed such crucial importance in
your arrangements.
The world does not love lawyers. It never has and it never will.
Sometimes the world is right, of course, but sometimes it is wrong. In his
early years, William Shakespeare wrote the history of the reign of King
Henry VI in three parts. These are blood infused offerings: that is what
his audiences wanted. In the whole of these three plays there is but one
joke. A rebellion led by Jack Cade comes into London, intent on trouble.
And when the rebels are mingling among themselves and asking how
they should begin, Shakespeare offers the immortal line "let's begin by
killing all the lawyers." And indeed in historical fact they did attack and
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destroy much of what is now the Temple, where the lawyers were already congregating. In the theatre everyone laughs. And it is a good joke,
but that rebellion is followed by the most terrible bloodshed. I shall come
back to it.
But what I suggest is striking about your revolution-and ours-is
this. Of course it was war. Men died and were maimed. There was much
suffering and much heroism. But when it was over, it was over. After the
execution of the king, I do not for a moment suggest that life was comfortable for his supporters, but when the fighting ended, they were not
rounded up and killed after a series of ritual trials. After your War of
Independence, those who supported the defeated king and Parliament
were allowed to leave if they wished. Again there was no rounding up
and series of ritual trials. Contrast that with the French Revolution which
occurred less than 20 years later than your own, or the Russian Revolution and the pogroms which followed them and the slaughter of different
classes of citizens. Is it too utterly fanciful to believe that these truly
were wars intended to establish legal principles by which the country
should be governed, and that the participants were genuinely not after
power for its own sake, and certainly not after absolute power, but for
power to be exercised within constitutional restraints? I think so, and
both our communities are indebted to this focus on legality.
After your war was won, one critical constitutional issue and one
critical social issue remained unresolved. The role of the judiciary did
not require to be addressed in those very early days, when a war had to
be fought and the peace properly secured. But when the issue did come
to be resolved, what was at heart was the success, or otherwise, of Jefferson's campaign against the federal judiciary. In England we have a saying, "cometh the hour, cometh the man." For you that hour was 1801,
and the man was Chief Justice John Marshall. In the history of the common law, his is one of the greatest and most influential of names. Probably more than any other judge-or to be fair to his brothers, any group of
judges-and probably more than any other leader of a group of judges, in
the decision in Marbury v. Madison his judgment established the constitutional arrangements and defined the role of the judiciary within an infant democracy. It was, in truth, law creation. Even for the moment ignoring the lecture to the Jefferson administration about the rule of law,
he in effect returned to Sir Edward Coke in Bonham's Case and, as you
all know, asserted, that it was for the court to interpret the Constitution. It
is just worth repeating my emphasis on the distinction between interpreting the law as expressed in statute or at common law and applying it (the
role of the court in England and Wales) and the authority to interpret the
very constitution itself (the role of the Supreme Court). It is this that
brings into stark focus such issues as the right of a woman to terminate a
pregnancy, not as a matter of legal right capable of alteration or amendment through Act of Parliament, but as a matter of constitutional entitle-
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ment in an arrangement in which amendments to the Constitution areand in reality, can only be-events of extreme rarity.
Jean Edward Smith, in his biography of John Marshall, summarised
the distinction between the tradition established by John Marshall and
our tradition in this way:
The English tradition held that the great constitutional documents of
British history were purely political statements that lay in the realm
of Parliament to interpret, not the courts. Jefferson subscribed to that
view: so did Jackson and even Abraham Lincoln doubted the
authority of the Supreme Court to resolve fundamental constitutional
issues in the course of ordinary litigation . .. Marshall took the opposite position ... he consistently held that the Constitution was law.
But I want to highlight this remarkable feature. This was an infant
republic, beset with problems, not bound to survive, fortunate that Britain was concentrating on the defeat of Napoleon who had subjugated the
entire mainland of Europe. I am not perhaps wholly able disguise that I
do not share the view that Jefferson should be sanctified. Personally I
prefer Adams. But, I cannot withhold my admiration for Jefferson's
sense of constitutional propriety, that notwithstanding the public lecture
on the rule of law, and his profound disagreement with Marshall's decision, after what I regard as a show of defiance, the decision itself was
allowed to stand. In the long-term that secured the rule of law in the U.S.
I hope that a modem politician, elected to power in our countries, would
comprehend why in similar circumstances it would be appropriate to do
what Jefferson did.
There remained, of course, the social question. The issue of slavery
was not resolved. It still rankles a little that in the first draft of the Declaration, a Virginian slave owner raged against slavery. It is even more
ironic, given that at the very time when there were those in Parliament
who were supporting the American cause, there were others who were
seeking to attack the slave trade. And indeed the great case of James
Somersett in 1772-heard before another of my predecessors, Lord
Mansfield-following an earlier decision from the reign of Elizabeth I
herself, finally and through a complicated process, established that the
ownership of a slave in England was incompatible with the laws of England, irrespective of any legal claim which might be valid elsewhere.
There could be no property in another human being. But with all that
said, it is easy now for us to be critical of failure to address the slavery
issue in the early constitutional arrangements. And we know, that it all
culminated less than 100 years later in the ghastly catastrophe of your
civil war.
May I just return to Shakespeare's early Henry VI plays. They are
far from his greatest plays. We all know about his portrayal of human
fallibility and frailty in its many manifestations in Macbeth, King Lear,
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Othello and Hamlet and the rest. But I venture to suggest that there is
nowhere in the entire canon of Shakespeare's plays where the condition
of common man is better portrayed than in his description of civil war:
none better than the haunting scenes where one soldier pulls a body on to
the stage, and then unmasking his enemy, discovers that he has killed his
father, followed by another in which another soldier pulls a dead body on
to the stage, and after congratulating his opponent on his toughness in the
fight discovers that he has killed his son. These are haunting scenes,
filled with pity. The son remembers that he will have to tell his mother
what he has done, and the father remembers that he will have to tell his
wife that he has killed their boy. Although no mother or wife appears on
the stage, Shakespeare is able to convey that each of these women is
there-but invisible, not actually on the stage-weeping the bitter tears
of the lifelong grief that lies ahead, truly part of the dreadful lamentable
scene, symbols of the nameless but innumerable victims of the ghastliness of a civil war.
My respectful view is that the founding fathers had little choice. If
the slavery issue had been addressed the cause about which they were
united would have been paralysed: with such deep seated divisions, we
might never have had a "United" States of America, but rather a continent of North America, fragmented to different states. Indeed the history
of the world in the last century would almost certainly have been different, and not for the better.
With the greatest of deference I suggest that these appalling sacrifices of this civil war were not in vain, and that all who died must be
honoured. Their sacrifices should be regarded as part of the price of your
independence, your nationhood, your Constitution, and the greatness of
your country, exactly as forecast by John Adams, now carrying the immense burden that it does, as the most powerful nation on earth.
My country once performed this role. It was known as Pax Britannica. That is no longer our role. No one loved us very much for it. Everyone can find fault with it. And of course we made mistakes, but there
were a great number of plusses in the ledger too. You too will now attract criticism, even when it is not deserved. If one of your young men or
women behaves in a way which all of you would find unacceptable, the
pictures flash around the world: there are no pictures of the brave young
man or woman who, at great personal risk, steps in to save the life of a
child in some foreign country. So your mistakes will be highlighted and
magnified, and the blessings you provide will largely be ignored. To be
the most powerful nation on earth is indeed a thankless task. Well, you
do not, and will not, lack for thanks from me.

